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Abstract 
 
We establish that domestically owned firms in two alternative models of emerging market 
economies, the Czech Republic and Russia, have not been converging to the technological 
frontier set by foreign owned firms.  In both countries, the distance of domestic firms to the 
frontier grew (in all parts of the distribution) from 1992-1994 to 1995-1997 and did not change 
from 1995-1997 to 1998-2000.  However, the distance to the frontier is orders of magnitude 
greater in Russia than in the Czech Republic throughout 1992-2000.  We also find in both 
countries that domestic firms in industries with a greater share of foreign firms are falling behind 
more than domestic firms in industries with a smaller foreign presence.  However, in the Czech 
Republic this “negative spillover” effect is diminished over time, whereas in Russia it continues 
to cause domestic firms to fall further behind.  On the other hand, we find in both countries that 
foreign firms experience positive spillovers from other foreign firms operating in the same 
product market.  This evidence on the dynamics of efficiency is consistent with the view that 
economies (firms) need to be more technologically advanced and open to competition in order to 
be able to gain from foreign presence. 
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1. Introduction 
  Are firms in the former communist economies converging to the world standard?  This is 
the key question in the most challenging economic transformation of the start of this century.  
While expert opinions differ on what constitutes a successful and complete transition,
1 it is 
generally acknowledged that transition economies need to raise substantially their productivity in 
order to catch up with the advanced countries.  In this paper, we show how much progress has 
been made in reducing the distance between the efficiency of domestic firms and the world 
technology frontier in two transition economies – the Czech Republic and Russia – and we 
assess whether the presence of foreign firms in these countries contributes to the reduction of the 
productivity gap (either through knowledge spillovers or competition). 
Russia and the Czech Republic are desirable model economies because they share useful 
similarities in their initial conditions, yet they represent polar cases of the strategy and 
implementation of the transition.  Unlike for instance Hungary and Poland, Russia and the Czech 
Republic maintained a relatively unreformed centrally planned system until the very end of the 
communist period, thus providing us with “authentic” initial conditions.  During the transition, 
both countries privatized most of the state assets in a way that was both rapid and controversial.  
Otherwise these economies pursued different paths, becoming prototypes of two distinct patterns 
of the transition process.  The Czech Republic exemplifies the Central European model.  It 
opened up to trade and capital flows, developed a relatively functioning market economy and 
gradually established institutions, rules and regulations that made it eligible, together with other 
Central European countries, for accession to the European Union.  Like the other 
Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries, Russia has remained more closed to the 
world.  It has changed its laws, regulations and institutions more slowly and without attempting 
to harmonize them with those of the European Union.  Hence, to the extent that private corporate 
governance and competition are effective in strengthening performance, we should expect firms 
in the Czech Republic to be closing the productivity gap and converging to the frontier more 
rapidly than firms in Russia. 
 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Brown (1999) for different views on the end of transition from the symposium on this topic.  2 
 
2. Evolution of the Productivity Gap and Distance to the Frontier 
We start by estimating and comparing changes in the levels of productive efficiency of 
domestic and foreign-owned firms in each of these two countries over the 1992-2000 period.
2 
Specifically, we estimate the following augmented translog production function with panel data 
on medium-sized and large firms in the industrial sector (manufacturing, mining, and utilities) in 
the Czech Republic and in Russia for three consecutive periods: 1992-94 (early transition), 1995-
97 (middle transition) and 1998-00 (mature transition):
3   
it i it it it v Z X y ε ρ β + + + = ln , (1) 
where yit represents the output (revenue) of firm i in year t, Xit is a vector of inputs (in translog 
specification) and dummy variables for (two-digit level ISIC) industries and years, Zit is a 
dummy for domestic ownership (with foreign ownership serving as the base), vi are unobserved 
time-invariant firm-specific effects, and εit is an independently distributed error term, with E(vi) 
= E(εit) = E(viεit) = E(εitεis) = 0 for ∀ t > s.  We treat domestic firms with private, mixed and state 
ownership as one category since we find in a companion paper that their efficiency is similar 
(Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell, 2004, henceforth SST, 2004).    
Next, for each firm i we calculate firm-specific productive efficiency in log points as 
i i v + = ρ ϕ , with E(ϕi)=ρ and E(vi)=0, and we measure how far the productive efficiency of 
domestic firms is from that of the frontier firms.
4  An important methodological question is how 
to define the world technology frontier.  Since in SST (2004) we find that the efficiency of 
foreign firms is above the efficiency of domestic firms at all respective points of the two 
                                                 
2 This part of our analysis relates to Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2004, forthcoming), who develop a 
model showing that firm responses to liberalization are likely to be heterogeneous, with technologically more 
advanced firms being more likely to respond by investing in new technologies and production processes.  They  find 
.in their empirical analysis of Indian firms, that deregulation of entry elicited heterogeneous performance responses 
in the same 3-digit sector but located in different states of India. 
3 Our sample is comprised of industrial firms with more than 100 employees at any point in time.  We use data on 
1,537 to 2,970 firms a year for the Czech Republic and 15,035 to 19,209 firms in a given year for Russia.  For a 
detailed description of the data and our methodology, see Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell (2004). 
4 The idiosyncratic errors (εit) are excluded from the definition of firm-specific productive efficiency in order to 
reduce the effect of transitory productivity shocks and statistical noise.  To allow for the time variation in productive 
efficiency, the estimates are performed within the 3-year consecutive sub-panels defined above. 3 
 
efficiency distributions, in this paper we use the average level of the estimated efficiency of the 
top third of foreign firms in a given two-digit industry as the benchmark for the frontier.
5  We 
believe this is superior to the alternative of using firms operating in advanced market economies 
as the benchmark since the latter approach is plagued by comparison problems associated with 
wide exchange rate fluctuations and different shocks and institutions across countries.   
We therefore estimate the (inverse) distance from the frontier as the ratio of each firm’s 
efficiency to the mean productive efficiency of the frontier foreign firms within a two-digit 
industry in each period.  The ratio indicates how far a firm is from the efficiency frontier.  When 
the ratio is large (closer to 1), the firm is approaching the frontier.  Since our measure of 
productive efficiency is in log form, we apply the following exponential transformation:  
( ) 66 . , | exp > − = θ ϕ ϕ α FOR k i i ,   (2) 
where αi is the firm-specific (inverse) measure of the distance to the frontier and  66 . , | > θ ϕ FOR k is 
the mean productive efficiency of the top third of foreign firms (above the 66
th percentile in θ) in 
industry  k.  We use random effect (RE) estimates to obtain our measure of productive 
efficiency.
6   
In Figure 1 and Table 1 we show for each time period the distribution of the domestic 
firms’ distance to the frontier (αi).  Two important findings emerge: a) in every period domestic 
firms in Russia are further away from the frontier than domestic firms in the Czech Republic; b) 
the distance from the frontier has grown from 1992-94 to 1995-97 and it did not change much 
from 1995-97 to 1998-2000.  During the period 1998-2000 the efficiency of the median domestic 
firm in the Czech Republic was 37.4% of the frontier, whereas it was only 14.6% in Russia.  
While the top 5% of the Czech domestic firms operated at the level of the frontier, the best 
Russian firms were not even close to this level.  Even more dramatic is the fact that the Russian 
firm at the 90
th percentile was the same distance from the frontier as the median Czech firm.   
In Table 1 we also show the distribution of the distance of foreign owned firms from the 
frontier.  In both countries, the distribution of foreign firms lies closer to the frontier than the 
                                                 
5 The results are similar if one takes other percentage benchmarks (e.g., 20 or 10 percent).  Note that smaller 
percentages, especially at the level of two-digit industries, are likely to contain more measurement error.  
6 The results are not very different from those that would be obtained with fixed effect or two-stage least square 
random effect estimators (SST, 2004). 4 
 
distribution of the domestic firms.  Moreover, the distribution of the distance of foreign firms is 
fairly constant over the three periods, although in the Czech Republic there is a slight increase in 
the distance from the first to the second period.  However, this increase is not as great as that of 
the domestic firms.   
Overall, in both countries domestic firms diverged from the frontier set by foreign firms 
during the first half of the transition and they stabilized this enlarged gap but did not succeed in 
diminishing it during the second half. 
3. Effect of Foreign Presence on the Productivity Gap 
If domestic firms are not catching up to the world efficiency standard in general, is it the 
case that they are converging to this standard in industries with a greater foreign presence and 
falling behind in industries with a smaller foreign presence, or vice versa?  In this section we 
explore these propositions.  Moreover, since foreign owned firms are more technologically 
advanced and globally accustomed to absorbing knowledge, we test if greater foreign presence 
has a positive effect on these firms and a less positive or negative effect on the domestic firms. 
Part of the FDI literature argues that foreign firms have beneficial “spillover” effects on 
the productivity of domestic firms by allowing the latter to observe and learn from the 
introduction of new products and processes to the domestic market (horizontal spillovers).
7  
Foreign firms may also act as a new and large source of demand for inputs, thus stimulating new 
production in upstream activities (vertical spillovers).  On the other hand, foreign firms can have 
a negative effect on domestic firms’ output and productivity, especially in the short run, if they 
compete with domestic firms and “steal their market”.  This may force domestic firms to cut 
back production and experience a higher average cost as fixed costs are spread over a smaller 
scale of production (Aitken and Harrison, 1998).  The question is which effects dominate. 
Studies of the effect of foreign presence on the productivity of domestic firms use data on 
domestic firms and include as an explanatory variable some measure of foreign presence, usually 
the share of foreign firms in a given industry’s output or employment.  The evidence from this 
research is mixed.  Studies of the same industry (horizontal spillovers) suggest that the effect is 
negative in developing countries such as Morocco (Haddad and Harrison, 1993) and Venezuela 
                                                 
7 Domestic firms can learn about the foreign firms’ management style, technology, and marketing techniques in 
many ways: through observation, from employees that have worked in these firms, etc. 5 
 
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999) as well as in transition economies such as Bulgaria and Romania 
(Konings, 2000), the Czech Republic (Djankov and Hoekman, 1998; Kosova, 2004) and Russia 
(Yudaeva et al., 2003).  However, Damijan et al. (2003) detect positive horizontal spillovers in 
five of the ten transition countries they examine.  The negative effect is usually attributed to a 
low “absorptive capacity” of domestic firms in the less developed countries.  It is argued that the 
larger the technology gap between the domestic and foreign firms, the less likely the domestic 
firms will be able to gain from foreign firms; by implication positive spillovers should be found 
in more technologically advanced sectors or in the more industrialized countries.
8  This latter 
hypothesis receives some support as Kinoshita (2000) finds positive horizontal spillovers in the 
R&D sector in the Czech Republic, while Haskel et al. (2002) find evidence of positive 
spillovers on the productivity of domestic plants in the UK.   
Unlike the existing studies in this area, we combine data on domestic and foreign owned 
firms and test whether foreign presence in a given industry affects productive efficiency of 
domestic and foreign firms differently.  In particular, we hypothesize that foreign presence in 
emerging market economies affects positively the efficiency of foreign firms, which are more 
advanced and have a globally developed absorptive (learning) capacity, while having a smaller 
positive or a negative effect on the efficiency of domestic firms, which are less efficient and may 
not yet have developed their absorptive capacity.  In order to implement this test, we augment the 
production function specified in equation (1) by including as explanatory variables the 
interaction of foreign presence with the dummy variables for domestic ownership and foreign 
ownership.  We measure foreign presence as the lagged share of foreign firms in total output in a 
given two-digit ISIC industry (FS(-i)t-1).
9  This measure is firm-specific because for each firm we 
exclude its own output in calculating FS(-i)t-1.  Such a specification helps capture what each firm 
learns from others rather than from itself and it also avoids the bias induced by having the firm’s 
own output on both sides of the equation.  In addition to estimating the average effects over the 
                                                 
8 The reverse hypothesis, that firms with a larger technology gap gain more from foreign presence, was put forth by 
Findlay (1978). 
9 We use the lagged value of foreign presence since spillovers may take time to materialize.   Moreover, by using the 
lagged value we avoid the potential problem of endogeneity, i.e., that foreign firms are attracted to industries with 
highly productive domestic firms.  The panel estimates that control for unobserved firm heterogeneity are also likely 
to reduce a potential endogeneity bias.  6 
 
1993-2000 period, we also examine how these effects change over time by introducing the 
interaction of the above variables with time trend.
10    
In Table 2 we present the summary statistics related to foreign presence in the two 
economies.  As may be seen from the table, the three measures of foreign presence that we report 
– share of the number of industrial firms, share of output, and share of employment – are highly 
correlated and they all indicate that foreign firms started from a very low share of total economic 
activity and increased their share over time.  Moreover, the three variables show that throughout 
the period of our analysis the share of foreign firms is much smaller in Russia than in the Czech 
Republic.  For example, the Russian share of industrial firms in 2000 is approximately one-fifth 
of the corresponding share in the Czech Republic. 
The estimated average (time invariant) and dynamic (time-varying) effects of foreign 
presence on productive efficiency of domestic and foreign firms in a given industry are reported 
in Panels A and B of Table 3, respectively.
11   In order to assess the sensitivity of the estimates to 
the estimation method, we report coefficients from pooled OLS, random effects (RE), fixed 
effects (FE), and the two-stage least squares random effect estimator (2SLS-RE).   
The last estimator exploits information on supervisory ministries under central planning 
in treating the potential endogeneity of ownership, i.e., that unobserved firm-specific 
productivity could determine the type of ownership by influencing the governments’ decisions to 
privatize or investors’ decisions to acquire the firm.  Since the ministries had significant control 
over the extent and process of privatization, the ministry dummy variables are correlated with 
(and hence are good predictors of) the ownership variables.  We use ministry categories and the 
one-year lagged X’s and Z’s to estimate the binary (probit) ownership model for each ownership 
type:  
( ) ( ) M Z X G M Z X Z t t j t t
j
t , 1 1 , 1 1 , , | 1 P − − − − = = , (3) 
where  j  indicates the ownership type (domestic and foreign) and M  is a vector of ministry 
categories.  We next use the fitted probabilities from the probit, ij G ˆ , as instruments for ownership 
                                                 
10 Since we are using a lagged variable, we exclude the 1992 data from the analysis. 
11 Due to space constraints, we present only the coefficients of the variables of interest.  The underlying coefficients 
on inputs of the translog production function display concavity and monotonicity at the geometric means of the 
variables. 7 
 
categories in the two-stage least squares random effects estimator.  These predicted probabilities 
have several useful properties as instruments for binary endogenous variables (e.g., Wooldridge, 
2002, pp. 621-633).  The IV estimator is asymptotically efficient, the fitted probabilities stay 
within [0,1] range, and the first stage equation need not be correctly specified. 
As may be seen from panel A of Table 3, all four methods yield the same pattern of key 
results with respect to the average effect of foreign presence over the 1993-2000 period: 
productive efficiency of domestic firms declines with greater presence of foreign owned firms in 
both countries and the negative spillover is much larger in Russia than in the Czech Republic.  
Over this period, a 10 percentage point increase in the foreign share of output in an industry 
reduces efficiency of domestic firms between 10.6% and 13.7% in the Czech Republic and 
between 47.1% and 50.1% in Russia, depending on the estimate.
12  Conversely, foreign owned 
firms experience positive spillovers from greater presence of foreign owned firms in their 
industry in both the Czech Republic (around 30.5% to 42.5%) and Russia (around 44.3% to 
54.0%). 
The time-varying effects, reported in panel B, indicate that the underlying dynamics 
varies across the two countries.  Except for some OLS estimates, the effect of greater foreign 
presence on domestic firms is (a) negative but becoming less so over time in the Czech Republic, 
and (b) negative initially and becoming increasingly negative over time in Russia. The time-
varying effects on foreign firms suggest that greater foreign presence has (a) an insignificant 
initial effect that becomes positive over time in the FE and RE estimates but remains 
insignificant in the OLS and 2SLS-RE estimates in the Czech Republic, and (b) a negative initial 
effect that becomes positive over time in Russia.   
4. Concluding Remarks 
Neither the Czech (Central European) not the Russian (CIS) model of transition has 
enabled domestically owned firms to converge to the technological frontier set by the most 
efficient foreign owned firms.  In both countries, the distance of domestic firms to the frontier 
grew from 1992-1994 to 1995-1997 and remained about the same from 1995-97 to 1998-2000.  
On the other hand, the average distance was much greater in Russia than in the Czech Republic.  
In both of these economies, greater presence of foreign firms in a given industry is 
estimated to have a negative average effect on productive efficiency of domestic firms in that 
                                                 
12 We have converted the coefficients in Table 3 into percentages with the formula: exp(β-1). 8 
 
industry but the effect is positive on the efficiency of other foreign owned firms.  This result 
parallels the finding of SST (2004) that, both in the Czech Republic and Russia, foreign firms 
that are closer to the technological frontier have a higher probability of improving their 
performance than foreign firms that lag further behind, but that domestic firms have about the 
same probability of moving closer or farther from the frontier irrespective of their initial 
position.  
Our dynamic estimates of the spillovers indicate that in the Czech Republic the negative 
spillover effect on domestic firms is alleviated over time, while in the Russia the negative 
spillover effect becomes stronger over time.  These findings suggest that in emerging market 
economies the hypothesized positive spillover (a) applies to foreign owned firms, which are 
relatively more efficient and prepared in terms of their absorptive capacity than local firms, (b) is 
negative but reversible among domestic firms in countries that open up and gradually adopt 
market-oriented and enforceable institutional and legal framework, and (c) is increasingly more 
negative on domestic firms in countries that are more technologically backward, have opened up 
less to trade and foreign competition, and have not carried out fundamental legal and institutional 
reforms.   
The implication of our findings may be extended further if one takes into account the 
findings of a parallel study of UK manufacturing by Griffith, Redding, and Simpson (2002), 
whose estimates suggest that there is convergence to the frontier and that increased foreign 
presence within an industry raises the speed of convergence to the technological frontier.  Taken 
together, these findings for the Czech Republic (CEE), Russia (CIS) and the UK (EU) are 
consistent with the notion that the spillovers from foreign presence are positive for all firms in 
relatively advanced economies, but that in the less developed economies they are positive only 
for foreign owned firms and may be (increasingly) negative for domestic firms.  Overall, our 
results suggest that future research needs to examine carefully the differential effects that 
globalization may have on local and foreign owned firms in both the advanced and emerging 
market economies. 
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Figure 1:  Distance of Domestic Firms to the Frontier by Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Frontier   1992-1994   1995-1997   1998-2000 
 
Notes:  The frontier is defined as the mean productive efficiency of the top third of foreign owned firms in a 2-
digit ISIC industry.  The efficiency estimates are obtained from the translog production function (specified in 
equation 1) estimated with a random effect estimator for each period separately.  The (inverse) measure of the 
firm’s distance to the frontier is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s efficiency to the frontier in its industry.  
Percentiles are constructed from the distribution of the firm-specific distance to the frontier for each ownership 
type. 
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Table 1: Distance to the Frontier by Ownership and Period 
 
Czech Republic 
Percentile Foreign  Domestic 
  1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 1992-1994 1995-1997  1998-2000 
10  0.286 0.218 0.205 0.250 0.186  0.189 
25  0.414 0.350 0.346 0.329 0.249  0.263 
50  0.612 0.574 0.556 0.445 0.345  0.374 
75  0.912 0.856 0.835 0.609 0.493  0.531 
90  1.125 1.118 1.109 0.829 0.732  0.766 
 
Russia 
Percentile Foreign  Domestic 
  1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 
10  0.079 0.077 0.092 0.072 0.048 0.043 
25  0.158 0.156 0.167 0.122 0.085 0.083 
50  0.278 0.322 0.338 0.195 0.144 0.146 
75  0.717 0.673 0.699 0.317 0.230 0.240 
90  1.349 1.350 1.324 0.482 0.353 0.371 
 
Note:  See notes in Figure 1 for definitions. 13 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of Foreign Presence for Selected Years 
 
 Czech  Republic  Russia 
Foreign  Firms’:  1992 1996 2000 1992 1996 2000 
Share  of  industrial  firms  0.035 0.126 0.307 0.001 0.034 0.056 
  (0.184) (0.332) (0.461) (0.026) (0.182) (0.229) 
Share  of  total  output  0.077 0.214 0.511 0.001 0.030 0.196 
  (0.266) (0.410) (0.500) (0.031) (0.171) (0.397) 
Share  of  total  employment 0.026 0.121 0.336 0.001 0.019 0.115 
  (0.159) (0.326) (0.473) (0.036) (0.137) (0.319) 
No. of firms  1537  2283  2084  16633  17138  15035 
 
Note:  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 3:  The Effect of Foreign Presence on the Efficiency Gap, 1993-2000  
 
Panel A:  Time–Invariant Effects 
  Czech Republic  Russia 
 OLS  RE  FE  2SLS-RE OLS  RE  FE  2SLS-RE 
Domestic  -0.275** -0.090** -0.017  -0.131** -0.820** -0.326** -0.124** -0.635** 
  (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) 
Domestic*FSt-1  -0.090  -0.147** -0.137** -0.112** -0.637** -0.674** -0.686** -0.695** 
  (0.046) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.048) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Foreign*FSt-1  0.119  0.266** 0.354** 0.335** 0.199  0.432** 0.481** 0.367** 
  (0.071) (0.047) (0.050) (0.055) (0.219) (0.102) (0.104) (0.115) 
No.  of  obs.  18434 18434 18434 15133  136769  136769  136769  125795 
R
2  0.759 0.740 0.656 0.752 0.681 0.672 0.599 0.690 
No. of firms  4313  4313  4313  3777  25594  25594  25594  23899 
 
Panel B:  Time –Varying Effects 
  Czech Republic  Russia 
  OLS RE  FE  2SLS-RE OLS RE  FE  2SLS-RE
Domestic  -0.271** -0.110** -0.039  -0.130** -0.806** -0.286** -0.066** -0.584** 
  (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) 
Domestic*FSt-1  -0.068  -0.371** -0.383** -0.342** -0.317** -0.209** -0.195** -0.210** 
  (0.088) (0.069) (0.070) (0.076) (0.066) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Domestic*FSt-1*t -0.005  0.041**  0.045**  0.040** -0.109** -0.165** -0.176** -0.177** 
  (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Foreign*FSt-1  0.215 -0.205 -0.150  0.267 -0.629 -0.794**  -1.115**  -0.998** 
  (0.207) (0.131) (0.134) (0.182) (0.393) (0.207) (0.215) (0.245) 
Foreign*FSt-1*t  -0.016  0.070** 0.074** 0.011  0.156*  0.211** 0.278** 0.234** 
  (0.032) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.069) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041) 
No.  of  obs.  18434 18434 18434 15133  136769  136769  136769  125795 
R
2  0.759 0.740 0.657 0.752 0.681 0.672 0.598 0.689 
No.  of  firms  4313 4313 4313 3777  25594  25594  25594  23899 
 
Notes:  FSt-1=the lagged share of foreign firms in total output by 2-digit industry and year.  Standard errors are in parentheses 
(robust in OLS); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The estimates are obtained from the translog production function 
specified in equation (1) and which includes industry dummies, year dummies.  t is time trend, with t=0 in 1993.  RE – random 
effects estimator, FE – fixed effects estimator, and 2SLS-RE – two stage least squares random effect estimator, with ministries 
under central planning as instruments for all ownership variables. 
 
  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF  9/30/2004 
Publication Authors  Date 
No 721: Distance to the Efficiency Frontier and FDI Spillovers  Klara Sabirianova Peter, Jan 
Svejnar, and Katherine Terrell 
Sept. 2004 
No. 720: An Analysis of Gender Wage Differentials in Russia from 
1996-2002 
Rita Hansberry  Sept. 2004 
No. 719: Returns to Schooling in Russia and Ukraine: 
A Semiparametric Approach to Cross-Country Comparative Analysis 
Klara Sabirianova Peter and 
Yuriy Gorodnichenko 
Sept 2004 
No. 718: The emergence of large shareholders in mass privatized 
firms: Evidence from Poland and the Czech Republic 
Irena Grosfeld and Iraj Hashi  Aug. 2004 
 
No. 717: Wage Determination Under Communism and In Transition: 
Evidence from Central Europe 
Swati Basu, Saul Estrin and Jan 
Svejnar 
Aug. 2004 
No. 716: The Evolution of Cross-Region Price Distribution in Russia  Konstantin Gluschenko  July 2004 
No. 715: Languages in the European Union: The Quest for Equality and 
its Cost 
Jan Fidrmuc and Victor 
Ginsburgh 
July 2004 
No. 714: Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting 
Behavior 
Jan Fidrmuc and Orla Doyle  July 2004 
No. 713: International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: 
Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999 
Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. 
Zelner and Mauro F. Guillen 
July 2004 
No. 712: Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial 
Openness 
Witold J. Henisz and Edward D. 
Mansfield 
July 2004 
No. 711: Interest Groups, Veto Points and Electricity Infrastructure 
Deployment 
Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. 
Zelner 
July 2004 
No. 710: Firms’ Price Markups and Returns to Scale in Imperfect 
Markets: Bulgaria and Hungary 
Rumen Dobrinsky, Gábor Kőrösi, 
Nikolay Markov, and László 
Halpern 
July 2004 
No. 709: The Stability and Growth Pact from the Perspective 
of the New Member States 
Gábor Orbán and György Szapáry  July 2004 
No. 708: Contract Violations, Neighborhood Effects, and Wage Arrears 
in Russia 
John S. Earle and Klara 
Sabirianova Peter 
July 2004 
No. 707: Determinants of Employment Growth at MNEs: Evidence 
from Egypt, India, South Africa and Vietnam 
Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, Saul 
Estrin and Klaus Meyer 
July 2004 
No. 706: Economic Reform in Tanzania and Vietnam: A Comparative 
Commentary 
Brian Van Arkadie and Do Duc 
Dinh 
June 2004 
No. 705: Beliefs about Exchange-Rate Stability: Survey Evidence 
from the Currency Board in Bulgaria 
Neven T. Valev and John A. 
Carlson 
June 2004 
No. 704: Returns to Schooling in China Under Planning and Reform  Belton M. Fleisher and Xiaojun 
Wang 
June 2004 
No. 703: Return to Skills and the Speed of Reforms: Evidence from 
Central and Eastern Europe, China and Russia 
Belton M. Fleisher, Klara 
Sabirianova Peter, and Xiaojun 
Wang 
June 2004 
No. 702: What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, 
Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania 
J. David Brown, John S. Earle 
and Dana Lup 
May 2004 
No. 701: The Effects of Multiple Minimum Wages Throughout the 
Labor Market 
T. H. Gindling and Katherine 
Terrell 
May 2004 
No. 700: Minimum Wages, Inequality and Globalization  T. H. Gindling and Katherine 
Terrell 
May 2004 
No. 699: Self-Selection and Earnings During Volatile Transition  Ralitza Dimova and Ira Gang  May 2004 
No. 698: Ecology and Violence: The Environmental Dimensions of War  Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. 
Schipani 
May 2004 
No. 697: Russian Cities in Transition: The Impact of Market Forces in 
the 1990s 
Ira N. Gang and Robert C. Stuart  May 2004 
No. 696: Firm Ownership and Internal Labor Practices in a Transition 
Economy: An Exploration of Worker Skill Acquisition in Vietnam 
Jed Friedman  May 2004 
No. 695: The Unanticipated Effects of Insider Trading Regulation  Art A. Durnev and Amrita S. 
Nain 
May 2004 